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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

KANDICE JEAN HATCH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 981585-CA

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from jury convictions for burglary of a non-dwelling, a third
degree felony; theft, a class A misdemeanor; and theft by deception, a class B
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a3 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly admit defendant's guilty pleas to two counts of
felony forgery for impeachment purposes under rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of
Evidence?
Defendant agreed at trial that the felony pleas were admissible for impeachment
purposes. This issue is therefore affirmatively waived, and no standard of review applies.

Defendant raised no objection to the prosecutor's opening statement below, nor did
she seek any other relief. On appeal, she provides no citation to the record showing that
her claims of prosecutorial misconduct were preserved below, nor does she allege any
exception to the preservation rule. Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(A)(B). Therefore, these issues
are not properly before the Court, and no standard of review applies.
4. Do defendant's multiple and unsubstantiated claims of error require
reversal of the jury verdict under the cumulative error doctrine?
Whether the cumulative effect of individually harmless errors requires reversal
turns on whether the errors as a whole undermine confidence in the outcome. State v.
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1995).
5. Is the evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict?
Defendant has not marshaled the supporting evidence on appeal; therefore, her
claim of insufficient evidence is not properly before the Court. State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d
470, 473 (Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. App. P. 24:
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain . . .
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
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Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness^]
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,.
.. (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with burglary of a non-dwelling, theft, and theft by
deception (R. 2-1).1 Following a jury trial on 11 March 1998, defendant was convicted as
charged (R. 65, 67, 69). The trial court imposed the concurrent, statutory indeterminate
terms of from zero to five years for burglary of a non-dwelling, one year for theft, and six
months for theft by deception (R. 113-111). Defendant was also ordered to pay fines and
restitution (id.).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On 15 March 1997, Bill Wilson discovered that his commercial storage unit had
been burgled and among the items missing was an old saddle of primarily sentimental
value. Four days later, on 19 March 1997, defendant, Wilson's former girlfriend, sold the
saddle to a pawn shop for fifty dollars.
*The pleadings volume is numbered in reverse chronological order.
5

Burglary
Wilson rented the storage unit in August 1996 after he lost his house in bankruptcy
proceedings (R. 58: 157).2 Wilson shared the storage unit with his former wife, Grace
Sharp, whom he divorced in 1992, but with whom he had a friendly relationship (id).
Following the divorce, Wilson and defendant had a romantic relationship from December
1995 to July 1996, or until approximately one month before Wilson rented his storage
unit (R. 58: 157-60, 173-74). Defendant did not have any personal property in Wilson's
unit (id)?
When Wilson visited his storage unit on 15 March 1997 to retrieve a washing
machine for his daughter, he discovered that the hasp had been pried off and the unit had
been burgled and vandalized (R. 58: 114-15, 156). Clothes were strewn about, boxes had
been ripped into, and an entertainment center lay broken into pieces on the floor (R. 58:
116). There were several items missing from the unit (R. 58: 156-57, 179-80). One of
the items missing was Sharp's saddle, a cherished childhood heirloom (R. 58: 127-28,
135, 158, 169, 181,268).

2

Citation to the transcript will be as (R. [record number]: [internal page number]).

3

Unbeknownst to Wilson, several months before he rented the unit, defendant's
daughter had rented the storage unit next to his unit for the purpose of storing her
mother's property (R. 58: 159).
6

Investigation
Corporal Byron of the Uintah County Sheriffs Department investigated the
burglary (R. 58: 114-15). Corporal Byron determined that there had been a forced entry
into the unit (R. 58: 116). Based on the type of destruction in the unit, Corporal Byron
believed that the burglary was not random, but was of a personal nature (R. 58: 124-25).
When Corporal Byron asked Wilson who he thought might have broken into the unit,
Wilson unhesitatingly named his ex-girlfriend, defendant, and her daughters (R. 58: 12426, 157-58, 160). This confirmed the corporal's hypothesis that the break-in was
"personal" (R. 58: 124-26, 130-31).
Four days after the discovery of the break-in, defendant sold Sharp's saddle to a
pawn shop in Vernal (R. 58: 148, 152, 213, 233-34). Defendant executed a bill of sale
and gave her name, thumbprint, and identification (R. 58: 152-53, 233-34). She also told
the pawn shop employee that the saddle had been a gift (R. 58: 152-53). The pawn shop
paid defendant $50 (R. 58: 148, 150-51, 213, 234).
After police discovered the saddle at the pawn shop, defendant agreed to come in
and be interviewed by Sergeant Hatzidakis, who assisted Corporal Byron in the burglary
investigation (R. 58: 194, 196, 200). Defendant admitted she was the one who sold the
saddle to the pawn shop (R. 58: 233-34). She also gave inconsistent statements during
the interview: defendant first claimed that Wilson gave her the saddle outright, then she
claimed that Wilson gave her the saddle to sell for him (R. 58: 196-97, 199).
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Additionally, as the interview became more focused, defendant became agitated and
disruptive (R. 58: 200). She began to scream and yell (id). Sgt. Hatzidakis terminated
the interview at this point, sensing that any further inquiry would be unproductive (id).
Sgt. Hatzidakis thought that defendant was trying to turn the focus away from the
interrogation by her erratic behavior (R. 58: 206).
Defense
At trial, defendant's daughter testified that she was present with others when
Wilson allegedly dropped the saddle off at defendant's home (R. 58: 211).4
Joe King, a family friend, testified that he saw the saddle on the floor of the
defendant's trailer (R. 58: 221). However, King did not remember when he saw the
saddle in the trailer; moreover, he was not present when Wilson allegedly dropped the
saddle off (R. 58: 221, 222). Rather, defendant and her daughters told King that
defendant had done so (R. 58: 222). By the time of trial, Joe had discussed the story that
defendant and her daughters told him about Wilson and the saddle several times (R. 58:
222). Defendant in particular "helped"King with his testimony (R. 58: 256-57).
Defendant also testified, acknowledging that she was upset with Wilson and felt
that he was in part responsible for her children becoming involved with social services
(R. 58: 165-66,203, 225, 231, 255-56). Defendant claimed that she went to New Mexico

4

Defendant represented that she was unable to contact the friends who were
present to testify (R. 58: 211).
8

with the understanding that Wilson would care for her daughters in her absence (R. 58:
224). Defendant informed jurors that she had been "in jail" (id). However, Wilson did
not take care of her daughters and, as a consequence, social services became involved (R.
58: 225). Defendant further testified that after she "got out" and returned to Vernal from
New Mexico, she tried to get in touch with her "PO" or probation/parole officer (R. 58:
226).
In addition to causing problems for her daughters, defendant claimed that Wilson
held some of her belongings and would not return them (R. 58: 161, 173-74, 203, 229-30,
231, 258). Accordingly, after returning from New Mexico, defendant began to look for
her dispersed property and traveled to Craig, Colorado, where Wilson was then living (R.
58: 226). Defendant threatened Wilson that if he did not return her property she would
file charges against him (R. 58: 229).
Defendant claimed that after she returned home to Vernal, Wilson brought her the
saddle to make amends for all the trouble he had caused (R. 58: 231-32). Defendant was
not sure when Wilson brought the saddle, but speculated that it was March 14th or 15th (R.
58: 259). A few days later, defendant took the saddle to the pawn shop and sold it (R.
58: 233-34). Defendant discussed her testimony with her daughters and her attorney four
or five times (R. 58:256).
On cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor brought out that defendant had
pled guilty to two counts of felony forgery a few days before trial (R. 58: 252-53).
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Defendant denied, however, having dealt with Sgt. Hatzidakis on any more than two prior
occasions, including the instant burglary (R. 58: 254-55).
The State called Sgt. Hatzidakis as a rebuttal witness and elicited two pieces of
information that went to defendant's veracity: First, that defendant's assertion that she
had dealt with the sergeant on two prior occasions was "very inaccurate" as he had "dealt
with her numerous, numerous times" over the past "twelve years"; and second, that
defendant's reputation in the community was for being "untruthful[] or deceptive" (R. 58:
260, 262-63).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant affirmatively waived her claim of error with regard to the
admission of her felony pleas for impeachment purposes under rule 609(a), Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Point 11(A). The trial court sua sponte precluded Sgt. Hatzidakis from testifying
as to the conclusion he drew from the fact of defendant's inconsistent statements;
therefore, defendant's claim of unfavorable error under rule 608(a), Utah Rules of
Evidence is not supported in the record.
Point 11(B). Defendant's complaint that Sgt. Hatzidakis was allowed to testify on
rebuttal that her testimony regarding her number of contacts with him was inaccurate is
unpreserved, as is her complaint that the sergeant's further rebuttal testimony failed to
establish that her reputation for untruthfulness existed at the time of trial. As defendant
10

argues no exception to the preservation rule, these claims are not properly before the
Court.
Point 11(C). Although defendant objected on foundation grounds to the sergeant's
testimony that she had a reputation for untruthfulness in the community, the trial court
properly overruled the objection based on Sgt. Hatzidakis's testimony that he had lived in
the community for 12 years, during which time he had numerous contacts with defendant.
Point H(D). Defendant's complaint that the prosecutor misrepresented Sgt.
Hatzidakis's testimony in his closing argument when he argued that defendant had a
reputation for untruthfulness in the community is unpreserved. As defendant argues no
exception to the preservation rule, this claim is not properly before the Court.
Point III. Defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly asserted his personal
knowledge of the case during his opening statement is unpreserved. As defendant argues
no exception to the preservation rule, defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct is
not properly before the Court.
Point IV. Defendant fails to establish any error in the record; therefore, her claim
of cumulative error necessarily fails.
Point V. Defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the jury verdict and
to demonstrate that, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is
insufficient. Her sufficiency challenge should therefore be rejected.

11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HER GUILTY PLEAS TO TWO
COUNTS OF FELONY FORGERY WERE IMPROPERLY
ADMITTED FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES UNDER RULE
609(a)(2), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, IS UNPRESERVED
In Point I of her brief, defendant challenges the admission of her guilty pleas to
two counts of felony forgery for impeachment purposes under rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules
of Evidence. Defendant does not dispute that her pleas to felony forgery involved
dishonesty or false statement as required by rule 609(a)(2), but rather that the guilty pleas
themselves did not amount to convictions for purposes of the impeachment rule. Aplt.
Br. at 13. It is undisputed, however, that defendant did not raise this particular objection
below, when the trial court determined that the prosecutor could elicit the felony pleas on
cross-examination under rule 609(a)(2). See Aplt. Br. at 11, 16. Therefore, this issue is
unpreserved.
A. Proceedings Below
Following defendant's testimony on direct, the trial court sua sponte called counsel
in chambers to "to go over whatever the parties want to get into as to the record, criminal
record of the defendant. And I do that because if it's not admissible, I don't want to
prejudice the jury" (R. 58: 236) (copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in
addendum A). The prosecutor indicated that his cross-examination of defendant would
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include questions regarding her previous incarceration in New Mexico (R. 58: 237-38),
add. A, as well as her local crimes involving dishonesty: a prior shoplifting conviction
and her recent guilty pleas to two counts of felony forgery (R. 58: 238), add. A. The
prosecutor opined that these inquiries were proper under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence (R. 58: 239), add. A. The trial court disagreed that the prosecutor's proffered
questions were permissible under rule 404(b) and would not allow the prosecutor to
inquire regarding the shoplifting conviction, or an earlier comment defendant had made
regarding her parole officer (R. 58: 242-43), add. A. However, the trial court indicated
that it would allow the prosecutor to ask about the felony forgeries under rule 609(a)(2)
(R. 58: 240, 244), add. A. In so ruling, the trial court admonished the prosecutor not to
unduly emphasize the forgeries: "[Y]ou are entitled to ask . . . if she's plead or found
guilty and what she pled to and then not go into the facts" (R. 58: 244), add. A. Defense
counsel agreed that the prosecutor's inquiry into the felony forgeries should be so limited
(R. 58: 245-48), add. A. Defense counsel then instructed defendant that when the
prosecutor asked about the forgeries she was to simply admit them (R. 58: 248), add. A.
The prosecutor subsequently elicited evidence of the felony forgeries as follows:
PROSECUTOR:

Have you ever been convicted of a crime involving
facilitating a fraud or making, completing, executing,
authenticating, issuing transferring, publishing, or uttering
any writing so that the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance
purported to be the act of another, specifically, to wit, a
number of bank checks issued on another person's account?

13

DEFENDANT:

Yes. I plead guilty on two counts, forgery.

PROSECUTOR:

And those are felony forgeries, and that was within the last
few days? Few weeks?

DEFENDANT:

About a week ago, I think.

(R. 58: 253), add. A. Thereafter, the prosecutor moved, without objection, to admit
Exhibit 3, a copy of the plea agreement (id). The Judgement and Order of Commitment
involving defendant's guilty pleas to felony forgery was entered on 11 August 1998,
approximately five months after the guilty pleas were admitted at the instant trial (Supp.
R. 142-140) (a copy is contained in addendum B).
B. Affirmative Waiver
For the first time on appeal, defendant complains that her pleas to felony forgery
were improperly admitted because she had not yet been sentenced on the pleas at the time
they were used to impeach her testimony. Aplt. Br. at 13. It is undisputed that defendant
failed to raise this objection below. Aplt. Br. at 12, 16. Indeed, defendant acknowledges
defense counsel participated in the allegedly erroneous ruling. Aplt. at 13. As
demonstrated above, defense counsel agreed that the felony pleas were admissible, but
that the prosecutor's examination of the pleas should be narrowly limited to their
existence and nothing more (R. 58: 245-48), add. A. Therefore, any objection to the
admission of the felony pleas on appeal has been affirmatively waived. See State v.
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah 1998).
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Given the clear waiver here, defendant cannot present this issue for the first time
on appeal unless she persuades the Court that the trial court committed "plain error or that
there are other exceptional circumstances." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah
App. 1992). Here, however, defendant does not argue any exception to the preservation
requirement in her opening brief; therefore, her claim is not subject to review. State v.
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5
(Utah 1995). See State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 n.8 (Utah App. 1995)
(recognizing "well settled rule" that the court will not consider issues raised for the first
time in a reply brief," including issues of plain error or exceptional circumstances), cert,
denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996).
C. No Unfair Prejudice
Even assuming defendant both properly presented her claim on appeal, and that it
was error to impeach defendant with the forgery pleas at the time of trial, defendant
ultimately suffered no unfair prejudice because her pleas have since become convictions.
As acknowledged by defendant, the Judgement and Order of Commitment regarding the
guilty pleas was ultimately entered on 11 August 1998 (Supp. R. 142-140), add. B. See
Aplt. Br. at 11 n. 2. Under this circumstance, reversing defendant's conviction would illserve the policy behind differentiating a guilty plea and a conviction for purposes of rule
609(a)(2).
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In State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah app. 1990), the Court was concerned that a
guilty plea could be withdrawn prior to the imposition of sentence, and therefore the
Court commented in dicta, that a guilty plea was not fairly equated with the finality of a
conviction for purposes of impeachment under rule 609(a)(2). Morrell, 803 P.2d at 294
n. 2. Here, however, defendant's guilty pleas were not withdrawn prior to sentencing:
defendant was in fact sentenced and convicted. See Aplt. Br., add. B. Thus, the jury
received no information regarding defendant's veracity that it was not ultimately entitled
to receive under rule 609(a)(2).
In claiming otherwise, defendant seeks a "windfall" based on a mere accident of
timing. Such is insufficient to establish prejudice. Indeed, in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
U.S. 364 (1993), the United States Supreme Court rejected a similar claim of prejudice in
an ineffective assistance analysis. Trial counsel in Fretwell failed to make an objection in
the sentencing proceeding that would have been supported by a decision which
subsequently was overruled. Id. at 366. Due to the change in the law, the result in
Fretwell was "rendered neither unreliable nor fundamentally unfair as a result of
counsel's failure to make the objection." Id. On that basis, the Supreme Court concluded
that no prejudice had occurred, and that to hold otherwise, "would grant criminal
defendants a windfall to which they are not entitled/' Id.
Here, defendant's prejudice claim fails for the same reason the prejudice claim in
Fretwell failed - it is based on a "windfall"to which defendant is not entitled. In light of
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the policy concern expressed in Morrell, the admission of the pleas, now convictions,
does not render the jury verdict unreliable or fundamentally unfair. See State v. Verde\
770 P.2d 116, 124 n. 15 (Utah 1989) (recognizing symmetry of prejudice requirement
under plain error and ineffective assistance analysis). See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d
170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (same). Defendant's claim of prejudice should therefore be
rejected.
POINT II

DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ELICITED AND ARGUED
REPUTATION EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 608(a), UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE
In Point II of her brief, defendant raises multiple claims of error regarding the
prosecutor's elicitation of negative veracity evidence in alleged violation of rule 608(a),
Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. As will be demonstrated below, defendant
fails to demonstrate that the trial court ruled unfavorably below, or that her claims are
preserved or otherwise merit appellate review.
A.

No Improper Veracity Evidence Was Admitted During the
Prosecutor's Direct Examination of Sgt Hatzidakis

First, defendant asserts that the prosecutor elicited improper veracity testimony
from Sgt. Hatzidakis during the State's case-in-chief. Aplt. Br. at 19-20. In so arguing,
however, defendant fails to acknowledge that the trial court ruled in her favor below.
Specifically, on direct examination of Sgt. Hatzidakis the prosecutor tried to elicit how
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the sergeant determined a suspect's veracity in an interview situation (R. 58: 198) (the
pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum C). The prosecutor asked what it
suggested to Sergeant Hatzidakis "when you get an a, b, or c, a gut to tell for somebody
that somebody gave it to me then somebody gave it, pawn it store it for you?" (id.). The
trial court sua sponte interjected that the prosecutor was "asking (the sergeant) to evaluate
on and comment on the truthfulness of the statement. He's not qualified to do that" (id.).
Defense counsel concurred in the trial court's observation (id.). The prosecutor restated
his question and the proceedings continued as follows:
PROSECUTOR:

Would you find it to be an
indicator of accuracy and
veracity to have
inconsistent statements
offered to you?

SGT. HATZIDAKIS:

I am sorry. One more time.

PROSECUTOR:

Would you find it - would
it suggest to you that a
person is being truthful
when they gave you
inconsistent statements?

SGT. HATZIDAKIS:

I would not believe -

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

I still object.

COURT:

Sustained.

TRIAL COUNSEL:

Form of the question, Your Honor.
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COURT:

He's not going to be
qualified to say whether or
not this -

PROSECUTOR:

I am not asking as an
expert. I thought I made
that plain in the foundation.
But just in the thousands of
interviews, just when
people who change their
story is likely to be truthful
or not truthful.

COURT:

He's not qualified. Sorry.

SGT. HATZIDAKIS:

I understand.

PROSECUTOR:

In this case, however, you
were given inconsistent
statements; is that true?

SGT. HATZIDAKIS:

I was given inconsistent
stories as to this particular
case.

PROSECUTOR:

Thank you.

(R. 58: 198-99), add. C. Trial counsel raised no further objection to the sergeant's
testimony.
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that the prosecutor succeeded in
eliciting improper veracity testimony from Sgt. Hatzidakis, and that the trial court erred in
failing to cure the alleged error. Aplt. Br. at 19-20 (citing Harmon, 956 P.2d at 271, for
the proposition that "one witness may not testify as to the credibility of statements made
by another person on a particular occasion"). As is demonstrated by the above record
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excerpt, however, the trial court sua sponte precluded the sergeant from testifying as to
either specifically or generally, what conclusion he drew from defendant's inconsistent
statements (R. 58: 198-99), add. C. Having failed to demonstrate that any arguably
improper testimony was admitted, defendant's claim collapses of its own weight and
should be rejected on that ground.5
B.

Defendant's Claims Regarding Sgt. Hatzidakis's Rebuttal Testimony
Are Unpreserved and Otherwise Lack Merit

Second, defendant complains about Sgt. Hatzidakis's rebuttal testimony to the
effect that 1) defendant's claim of limited dealings with him was "[v]ery inaccurate," and
2) that she had a reputation for being untruthful and/or deceptive (R. 58: 260, 263)
(copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum D). Aplt. Br. at 2021. As to the former, on cross-examination defendant denied having dealt with the
sergeant on any more than two prior occasions, including the instant burglary (R. 58: 25455), add. D. The prosecutor called Sgt. Hatzidakis as a rebuttal witness to refute
defendant's claim and elicited information that the sergeant had lived in Vernal for 12
years, where he had also been employed in law enforcement (id). The prosecutor then
inquired of the sergeant, "you just heard the defendant testify that she's only dealt with

5

In any event, because the prosecutor rephrased his initial question and focused
instead on the sergeant's opinion as to the meaning of inconsistent statements in general,
rather than as to defendant's particular inconsistent statements in this case, the question
was ultimately, arguably consistent with rule 608(a). Cf. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388, 393 (Utah 1989) (holding that rule 608(a)(1) bars admission of an expert's testimony
as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion).
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you on two occasions over those 12 years that you have been here in town. Would you
please tell the jury whether that's accurate or not?" (R. 58: 260), add. D. The sergeant
responded that defendant's testimony was, "Very inaccurate" (id). Indeed, the sergeant
testified that he had "dealt with [defendant] numerous, numerous times," "over the entire
12 years" (id.).
Having established this foundation for the sergeant's opinion, the prosecutor asked
Sgt. Hatzidakis if he knew whether defendant had a "reputation in this community for
truthfulness or untruthfulness?" (R. 58: 260-61), add. D. Sgt. Hatzidakis responded
affirmatively (id.). Trial counsel objected "with reference to [the sergeant's] knowledge,
as to whether or not he is specifically going into any particular area that would be
necessarily helpful to this jury, I don't think, with reference to that without something
more than just the fact that they had had meetings or confrontations or whatever for
whatever reason." (R. 58: 261), add. D. The prosecutor responded that rule 608(a)
precluded his asking for specific instances, and that his question to the officer had tracked
the language of the rule (id.). The trial court nevertheless sustained the objection "on this
basis, that the issue is his knowledge of the witness' reputation in the community, not
among law enforcement, but in the community at large" (R. 58: 261-262), add. D. The
prosecutor rephrased the question and the.examination continued as follows:
PROSECUTOR:

Whether in the course of your
dealings, not only with your
officers, but other people that
have been, and again without
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disclosing circumstances, other
people who have been involved in
those situations with the
defendant?
TRIAL COUNSEL:

I object to that.

COURT:

Sustained. The issue . . . is not
with respect to any particular area,
investigations or noninvestigations, just is he familiar
with the reputation of this
person's - excuse me - is he
familiar with this person's
reputation in the community with
respect to honesty. That's all.

PROSECUTOR:

What I am trying to do is lay the
foundation for his ability to give
that.

COURT:

But it doesn't relate to
investigations at all. See, leave
that out of your question, I think
we'll be all right.

PROSECUTOR:

Are you aware of whether or not
the defendant has a reputation for
truthfulness or untruthfulness?

SGT. HATZIDAKIS:

Yes.

PROSECUTOR:

What is that reputation?

TRIAL COUNSEL:

I think I object on the same basis.
I still don't think there is a proper
foundation with reference to the
community at large.
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COURT:

Overruled. I think that that's you can cross-examine him on the
issue. Overruled.

PROSECUTOR:

What is her reputation?

SGT. HATZIDAKIS:

I think it would be more towards
the untruthfulness or deceptive.

(R. 58: 262-63), add. D.
In claiming error as to the sergeant's characterization of her testimony as "[vjery
inaccurate," defendant fails to acknowledge that no objection was made to the sergeant's
testimony below and that the issue is therefore unpreserved. See Aplt. Br. at 21. See also
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917. As defendant argues no exception to the preservation rule in
her opening brief, her claim is not subject to review. Johnson, 174 P.2d at 1144-45;
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700 n.8.6
In regards to defendant's challenge to the sergeant's additional rebuttal testimony,
that defendant had a reputation for untruthfulness and deception, it is also unpreserved.
Specifically, defendant claims that the prosecutor failed to elicit testimony from the
6

Even if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve this issue, it is
also inadequately briefed. Defendant cites no authority that the sergeant's personal
knowledge and experience constitutes improper veracity testimony under rule 608(a), and
the State is aware of no such authority. Cf. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 392 (holding that rule
608(a) bars admission of an expert's opinion as to the truthfulness of a witness on a
particular occasion). Therefore, the claim can be rejected on the additional ground that it
fails to comply with the briefing rule. See Utah R. App. P. 24(9); State v. Price, 827 P.2d
247, 249 (Utah App. 1992) (declining to reach merits of an issue in part, due to appellants
failure to "demonstrate 'under applicable authorities" why the claimed error necessitated
reversal).
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sergeant that defendant's reputation for untruthfulness existed at the time of trial Aplt.
Br. at 21-22. Defendant, however, failed to raise this particular objection in the trial court
(R. 58: 260-63), add. D. Because defendant argues no exception to the preservation
requirement in her opening brief, this issue is waived. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917;
Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1144-45; Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700
n.8.7
C.

The Prosecutor Established Adequate Foundation for Sergeant
Hatzidakis's Reputation Evidence

Third, defendant cursorily claims that the prosecutor failed to lay adequate
foundation for Sgt. Hatzidakis's testimony that defendant had a reputation for
untruthfulness and deception. Aplt. Br. at 22. The prosecutor established, however, that
the sergeant had lived in the community for 12 years and that through his career in law
enforcement and otherwise, had "numerous contacts" with defendant "over the entire 12
years" (R. 58: 259-60), add. D. The trial court accordingly overruled trial counsel's

7

Even if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve this claim,
defendant cites only one non-controlling authority for the erroneous proposition that
"reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness must be established at the time of trial."
Aplt. Br. at 22 (citing United States v. Null, 415 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1969)). Contrary to
defendant's representation, Null recognizes the general rule that reputation evidence must
be confined to reputation at the time of the crime; however, it is within the discretion of
the trial court to admit current reputation evidence under unique circumstances. Id. at
1180. Null does not therefore mandate that a witness's reputation for veracity must be
demonstrated to exist at the time of trial. Id. Indeed, the State is aware of no such
requirement under rule 608(a). See EDWARD L. KIMBALL & RONALD N. BOYCE, UTAH
EVIDENCE LAW (1996).
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objection to the sergeant's testimony (R. 58: 263), add. D. Trial counsel did not request
an opportunity to voir dire the sergeant (id).
On appeal, defendant cites no authority that this foundation is inadequate for
purposes of rule 608(a), and the State is aware of none. See, e.g., United States v. Nace,
561 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1977) (adequate foundation for rule 608(a) testimony
established where reputation witnesses had lived in same community as defendant for 8
and 25 years). Defendant's claim should therefore be rejected.
D.

Defendant Misrepresents the Prosecutor's Closing Argument and Also
Failed to Preserve any Objection Thereto8

Finally, defendant erroneously claims that Sgt. Hatzidakis testified only as to his
personal opinion of defendant's veracity, and not as to her reputation for truth and
veracity in the community. Aplt. Br. at 23. Defendant therefore suggests the prosecutor's
closing argument that defendant had a reputation for untruthfulness in the community
misrepresented the sergeant's testimony. Id. To the extent defendant is suggesting that
the alleged misrepresentation amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, her challenge fails.
First, defendant raised no challenge to the prosecutor's closing argument below (R. 58:
280) (a copy of the argument is contained in addendum E). Because defendant argues no
exception to the preservation requirement in her opening brief, this issue is not preserved

defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct in the opening statement are
addressed in Point III of this brief.
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for review on appeal. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917; Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1144-45;
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700 n.8.
Second, even if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve her
claim, no error occurred. As demonstrated in Point 11(B), the prosecutor elicited and the
sergeant in fact testified as to defendant's reputation in the community (R. 58: 261-63),
add. D. Therefore, the prosecutor did not misrepresent the sergeant's testimony in his
closing argument when he asserted that defendant had a "reputation in town for
untruthfulness" (R. 58: 280), add. E. Defendant's frivolous claim to the contrary should
be rejected.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF MISCONDUCT IN THE
PROSECUTOR'S OPENING STATEMENT ARE UNPRESERVED
AND ALSO LACK MERIT
In Point III of her brief, defendant claims that the prosecutor's opening statement
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because he allegedly "asserted personal knowledge
and belief about disputed facts including defendant's guilt." Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant
did not object to the prosecutor's opening statement below, nor did she ask for a curative
instruction. On appeal, she argues no exception to the preservation rule in her opening
brief. Id. Her claim of prosecutorial misconduct in the opening statement is therefore
waived. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 917; Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1144-45; Pledger, 896 P.2d at
1229 n.5; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700 n.8.
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Even if the court were to overlook defendant's failure to properly preserve her
claim, defendant fails to demonstrate that absent the prosecutor's statements, there was a
reasonable likelihood of a different result. State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah
App. 1998).
Specifically, defendant complains about two statements in the prosecutor's
opening. See Aplt. Br. at 27:
1)

"And after the case is over, the best thing here today is, I am going to be
able to give Grace her saddle back" (R. 58: 108) (a complete copy of the
prosecutor's opening statement is contained in addendum F of the State's
brief);

2)

"But you are here to do one thing, and that's to find the truth. And the truth
is this defendant got mad, she tore up Bill Wilson's storage shed, busted up
his entertainment center. She took the saddle. . . . Saddle went down to
Jiffy Pawn. Jiffy Pawn made out the money. They are out the money.
Grace is out the saddle. And the defendant is here today to answer for it"
(R. 58: 109), add. F.

Defendant claims that these statements "unfairly exploit the prosecutor's standing and
prestige with the jury," and also "imply that the prosecutor ha[d] access to information
outside the record that supports his assertions" as to defendant's guilt. Aplt. Br. at 27-28.
It is generally accepted that an opening statement should be an unargumentative
overview of the facts the party tends to prove. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254
(Utah 1988) (discussing State v. Williams] 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982)), habeas corpus
granted, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). The prosecutor's statements
here may well lean more towards argument than an evidentiary overview. However, the
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prosecutor's opening statement was not so troublesome as to evoke an objection or other
request for relief from defense counsel.
Moreover, the jurors did not hear anything in the prosecutor's opening statement
that they would not have ultimately been entitled to hear in closing argument. See State v.
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989) (noting the wide latitude of counsel in closing
argument to "discuss fully from their standpoints the evidence and the inferences and
deductions therefrom"). While the prosecutor's statements might have been more
circumspect, the prosecutor essentially drew deductions from the evidence to be presented
and predicted what the jury would ultimately find. As such, it is "unlikely that the jury
considered the statements to be factual testimony from the prosecutor-the evil to be
guarded against[.]" Id. This is particularly true where the trial court admonished the jury
before opening statements that anything that the attorneys said was not evidence (R. 58:
87, 89) (copies of the pertinent transcript pages are contained in addendum F). A jury
instruction to the same effect was also given (R. 73) (Jury Instruction #20) (a copy is
contained in addendum H). Such instructions have been held to cure any improper
statements in the prosecutor's opening. Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1284 (declining to find error
where jury was instructed to not to regard counsels' statements as evidence); Harmon,
956 P.2d at 277 (Utah 1998) (same). Defendant therefore fails to demonstrate that the
prosecutor's opening statement "call[ed] to the attention of the jury a matter it would not
be justified in considering in determining its verdict[,]" let alone any prejudicial error.
28

State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 7509 754 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.23d 693 (Utah
1996).9 Defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct should be rejected.
POINT IV
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL
In Point IV of her brief, defendant argues that the cumulative error doctrine should
be applied here. Aplt. Br. at 29-31. Under that doctrine, even though errors may not
individually warrant reversal, this Court may still reverse where the errors cumulatively
undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). However, for the reasons already argued,
defendant fails to demonstrate any error occurred; therefore, the Court need not consider
whether the cumulative effect of these actions undermines confidence in the outcome. Cf.
9

To the extent defendant incorporates her claims of evidentiary error in Points I-II
of her brief into her claim of prosecutorial misconduct in Point III of her brief, see Aplt.
Br. at 25, her claim lacks merit for the reasons articulated in Points I-II of this brief.
Insofar as defendant notes that the prosecutor included in his opening, the
statement that Sgt. Hatzidakis "'didn't think he could believe [defendant] simply because
she was telling a shifting story,"9 Aplt. Br. at 19 (quoting R. 58: 108), add. E, this
statement did not accurately reflect the evidence ultimately adduced. As set out in Point
II of this brief, trial counsel succeeded in precluding the sergeant's testimony that
defendant's shifting explanations caused him to believe that she was lying. However, as
noted in the body of this point, the sergeant did testify that defendant's stories were
shifting and based on that testimony, the prosecutor could have argued in his closing that
defendant's shifting explanations reasonably suggested that she was lying. Parsons, 781
P.2d at 1284. Therefore, the inference that defendant was a liar was properly before the
jury in any event. Defendant thus fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor's statement
undermines confidence in the trial outcome. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1254-55 (minor
discrepancy between opening statement and facts adduced held not to constitute
prejudicial error).
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id. at 350 (finding that the trial record contained numerous, individually harmless errors
before concluding that the cumulative effect undermined confidence in the outcome).
POINT V
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY
VERDICT
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her for burglary of
a non-dwelling, theft and theft by deception. Aplt. Br. at 31-33. Specifically, defendant
complains that there was no direct evidence that she burgled Wilson's storage shed, and
that the case therefore involved essentially a credibility contest between herself and
Wilson. Id. Defendant maintains that absent the veracity evidence that she had
committed two previous crimes involving dishonesty, that she appeared to be lying during
her interview with Sgt. Hatzidakis, and that she had a reputation for untruthfulness in the
community, "[t]he jury would have had a much more difficult even impossible time
deciding whether Wilson or [defendant] was telling the truth." Aplt. Br. at 32.
Defendant's sufficiency challenge fails for several reasons, the first of which is her
failure to marshal the supporting evidence and, viewing it in the light most favorable to
the jury verdict, demonstrate its inadequacy. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah
App. 1990). Her claim of insufficient evidence may rejected on this ground alone. State
v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991) (finding it would be inappropriate to entertain

30

the merits of defendant's sufficiency challenge where defendant failed to marshal the
evidence supporting the jury verdict).
In any event, defendant's insufficiency claim lacks merit. For reasons set forth in
Points I-III of this brief, the veracity evidence of which defendant complains was properly
admitted here. Therefore, defendant's claim of insufficiency necessarily rests solely on
the lack of direct evidence that she burgled Wilson's storage shed. However, there is
abundant circumstantial evidence pointing to defendant as the culprit.
In reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate court views "'the
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)
(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)); State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540,
545 (Utah 1994)). The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or assess witness
credibility, but assumes that "the jury believed the evidence and inferences that support
the verdict." State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993). Evidence is sufficient only
when so viewed, it is sufficiently inconclusive or so inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the charged crime. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1991).
When viewed in the foregoing light, the following circumstantial evidence
presented at trial was more than sufficient for the jury to find that defendant burgled
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Wilson's storage shed, stole Sharp's saddle from therein, and sold it to Jiffy Pawn for
$50.00:
•

Upon discovery, Wilson immediately reported the burglary of his storage
shed, and the theft of his former wife's saddle, on 15 March 1997. The
investigating officer observed that the burglary appeared to have been
committed by someone that knew Wilson, and was of a personal nature.
None of the nearby sheds, including defendant's shed, had been burgled (R.
58: 114-16, 124-28, 130-31, 135, 156-159, 169, 181,268)

•

When so informed, Wilson unhesitatingly suggested defendant and her
daughters as the potential culprits (R. 58: 124-26, 157-58, 160).

•

Four days after the burglary was reported, defendant sold Sharp's saddle to a
local pawn shop for $50 (R. 58: 148, 150-52, 213, 233-34).

•

While defendant had previously had a romantic relationship with Wilson, it
had turned acrimonious by the time of the burglary. Defendant blamed
defendant for her daughters becoming involved with social services while
she served time in New Mexico. Defendant also claimed that defendant
failed to return much of her personal property and she threatened to file
charges against him (R. 58: 161, 165-66, 173-74, 203, 224-26, 229-31, 25558).

•

Defendant's daughter testified that she was present when Wilson dropped
the saddle off; however, defendant was unable to contact other friends that
she claimed were also present. Defendant's daughter, and a friend who
testified that he saw the saddle at defendant's home, rehearsed their
testimony with defendant (R. 58: 211, 222, 256).

•

Wilson and Sharp both testified that neither had given the saddle to
defendant nor authorized her to sell it (R. 58: 162-63, 182-83).

Taken together, the above evidence sufficiently supports defendant's convictions for the
instant burglary and theft crimes, even absent the properly admitted veracity evidence
discussed in Points I-III, supra, and absent direct evidence of defendant's involvement. It
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was simply within the province of the jury to determine whether to believe defendant or
Wilson and Sharp. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 791 (Utah 1984). As stated, it is
presumed on appeal that the jury believed that evidence which supports its verdict. State
v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah App. 1990). Here, where defendant was found in
possession of recently stolen property of little more than sentimental value to its owner,
her explanation that it was given to her as repayment for wrongs done to her lacks
credibility. The jury reasonably rejected defendant's story and her sufficiency challenge
should be similarly dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's jury convictions for burglary of a non-dwelling, theft, and theft by
deception should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on2/September 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

1

would like to talk to you folks about in chambers.

2

And I do have a telephone call that I am expecting.

3

Would you like to step down, please.

4
5

Can I see you gentlemen for a few minutes in
chambers.

6

Court will be in recess.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

7

MR. WALLENTINE:

8

THE COURT: We are in chambers, and at the

9

court's request, I am going to go over whatever the

10

parties want to get into as to the record, criminal

11

record of the defendant.

12

it's not admissible, I don't want to prejudice the

13

jury.

Okay.

And I do that because if

14

MR. BEASLIN:

15

THE COURT: Mr. Wallentine, what would you

16

I agree.

like to get in?
MR. WALLENTINE: I intend to ask her

17
18

questions about her ability to drive back and forth

19

from New Mexico.

20

and why she thought it was important to tell the jury

21

about a conversation with her parole officer.
MR. BEASLIN:

22
23

I intend to ask her what she meant

She had a report when she got

back.

24

MR. WALLENTINE: I don't know that.

25

MR. BEASLIN:

The P.O. just slipped out.

MR. WALLENTINE: Perhaps she thinks it has

1
2

some relevance to the case.
MR. BEASLIN:

3
4

relevance.

5

did.

I don't think it had any

She was ordered to report.

That's all she

6

MR. WALLENTINE: Your opinion of relevance.

7

THE COURT: We can do that out of the

8

presence of the jury, see if it does have any

9

relevance.

It appeared to me somebody asked, what did

10

you do after you got back.

11

I'll allow you.

12

the jury just to make sure.

13

I reported to my P.O.

But

We'll do that out of the presence of

MR. WALLENTINE: I intend to ask her the

14

questions as to whether she had access to that storage

15

shed prior to February of 1997. And, if not, why she

16

didn't have access.

17

MR. BEASLIN:

18

MR. WALLENTINE: Seems to me that if she's in

19

She wasn't here.

That's right.

prison that's a good alibi.

20

MR. BEASLIN:

21

MR. WALLENTINE: Not unless you get the --

22

THE COURT: We have had various statements

23

that come in. And I think some of them were during

24

your examination of the witnesses which talked about

25

her being in prison.

That is a good alibi.

I think the daughter talked

1

about it. A n d so that's kind of out. So I don't know

2

that that's going to --

3

M R . WALLENTINE:

They have opened the door.

4

The door is open and the breeze is blowing.

A n d it

5

would b e error for y o u not to let m e ask those

6

questions.

7

involving dishonesty.

A n d I intend to ask h e r about crimes

8

THE COURT:

9

M R . WALLENTINE:

Like what?
The shoplifting that she

10

claims w a s a baby accidentally taking cigarettes while

11

climbing a rack at Smith's.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. WALLENTINE:

Anything else?
I have a certified copy of

14

that conviction.

15

recently just admitted to forging some checks before

16

Judge Anderson.

17
18

A couple of forgeries where she's

Felony convictions.

M R . BEASLIN:

I don't think that would be

admissible as to that.

19

MR. WALLENTINE:

20

MR. BEASLIN;'

Oh, find me a --

The question w a s whether o r not

21

y o u had been convicted of a felony.

22

That's i t .

23

MR. WALLENTINE:

24

THE COURT:

25

M R . BEASLIN:

No.

She says, y e s .

No.

That f s the old rule.
Y o u can't g o beyond that.

1

MR. WALLENTINE:

2

MR. BEASLIN:

3

You bet you can.
I don't think the new law

didn't pass yet.
MR. WALLENTINE:

4

It's not a law.

It's an

5

order.

It's a rule that the Utah Supreme Court, it

6

was issued by the advisory committee and signed by

7

Justice Zimmerman the same day.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. WALLENTINE:

What's that?
The rule reversing Deporto.

10

But independent of that you can still ask questions

11

about crimes involving false statement or dishonesty.

12

And you can't argue to me just because there is no

13

basis to say that a forgery crime is not a false

14

statement and a dishonesty.

15

THE COURT:

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Under 404(b) this wouldn't come

in.
MR. WALLENTINE:

404(b) is not a rule of

exclusion, it's a rule of inclusion.
THE COURT:
relevance.

Yes. But it has to have some

It has to be relevant to this crime.

MR. WALLENTINE:

Any conviction for a crime

of dishonesty can be used to impeach.
THE COURT:

That would not be Rule 404(b) .

24

I'll rule that it doesn't come in under 4 0 4 ( b ) .

25

have received the new ones.

Look at 609. Ken's

I

1

right.

2

two or three weeks. 609.
MR. BEASLIN:

3
4

M R . WALLENTINE:

9

10

Apply the rules of evidence

as it exist at the time of trial.
M R . BEASLIN:

7
8

This occurred back in # we are

talking about a year ago.

5
6

The Supreme Court changed that within the last

We are talking about March of

'97.
MR. WALLENTINE:

THE COURT:

True.

He f s correct.

But I have ruled

11

that 404(b) doesn't.

12

credibility of witnesses other than the accused -- has

13

been convicted of a crime - - i t says, "Evidence that

14

an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be

15

admitted if the court determines that the probative

16

value of admitting this evidence outweighs its

17

prejudicial effect to the accused, and the evidence

18

that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall

19

be admitted if it involved dishonesty o r false

20

statement regardless of the punishment."

21

the elements of forgery?

22

609 for the purpose of attacking

MR. WALLENTINE:

So what are

Judge, I appreciate that you

23

want to look at the elements, but I cannot imagine

24

that there is any way in the world that anyone can

25

argue that a forgery, particularly a forgery of a

1

check, is not both a false statement, because you are

2

giving a false name and a dishonest statement, because

3

you are representing that you have authority to take

4

funds pursuant to that check when in fact you don't.
THE COURT: I know the Supreme Court has

5
6

found that theft isn't dishonest.
MR. WALLENTINE: May not be, Judge.

7
8

not what the case says.

10

to indicate.

11

in 76-6.

13
14

It says "may not be."

THE COURT: You would have to give me facts

9

12

That's

Can you tell me what the cite would be

MR. WALLENTINE: Sure it's on the -- let's
look at the conviction here. 76-6-501.
THE COURT: Mr. Beaslin, one of the elements

15

of forgery is, well, it's in the alternative.

16

the problem.

17

the authority or utter an altered writing.

18

way of doing it.

19

issue, transfer, publish, or utter a writing so that

20

the writing on the making, completion, execution,

21

authentication, issuance, transference, publication or

22

utterance purports to be the act of another.

23
24
25

That's

You can either alter a writing without
That's one

Or if you make, complete, execute,

MR. WALLENTINE: Which is the conduct that
she pled guilty to.
THE COURT: How do we know that?

MR. WALLENTINE:

-1

"The elements of the crime

2

with which I am charged are as follows." And that

3

charge is contained right here in the affidavit signed

4

by her.

5

THE COURT: I think forgery requires a fraud.

6

Looks to me like maybe this comes in, Mr. Beaslin.

7

you have anything that you would like to say?

8

looked at the statute.

9

ready for me to rule on it?

10
11
12
13

MR. BEASLIN:

Hold that thought.

We have

Are you

Probably, conceivably it would

fit the statute, it looks like.
THE COURT: Do you have any argument that I
shouldn't?

14

MR. BEASLIN:

15

THE COURT: Okay.

16

MR. BEASLIN:

Not really.

Not at this point.

Very briefly.

Now, what are you proposing?

17

What are you proposing to do with those two things?

18

One thing or two things?

19
20

Do

MR. WALLENTINE: There is also a shoplifting
conviction.

21

THE COURT: No, not the shoplifting.

22

don't want you to go into the parole officer unless we

23

do it out of the presence of the jury and it has some

24

relevance.

25

MR. WALLENTINE: Okay.

Underlying

And I

1

conviction, there is a robbery.

2

robbery.

3

dishonesty?

A n aggravated

Would that not be a crime involving

4

MR. BEASLIN:

5

THE COURT:

Not necessarily.
Not necessarily.

It's the intent

6

but not necessarily a -- for the same reason theft

7

isn't necessarily -MR. WALLENTINE:

8
9
10

I disagree.

It's dishonest

to take someone else's property away from them.

And

the theft, shoplifting.
THE COURT:

11

I agree with you.

But, for the

12

record, that's not what the appellate courts have told

13

us.
MR. WALLENTINE:

14

And shoplifting, as she

15

related it to us this morning, would constitute a

16

crime involving dishonesty.

Her story was that she

17

lacked any criminal intent.

Her story was that her

18

baby climbed up the rack and took two cartons of

19

cigarettes.

20

THE COURT:

21

robbery or the shoplifting.

22

issue as to a parole officer out of the presence of

23

the jury.

24

will let you get into the forgery.

I am a little bit

25

worried about how you get into it.

You just talk to

Not letting you get into the
We'll take care of any

I highly doubt it has any relevance.

And I

1

her about it and get in and out of it.

2

to give undue influence to it, I think that has some

3

403 issues that I don't think are appropriate.

4

tell them she's convicted of forgery, get her to admit

5

it. You can talk to her, Mr. Beaslin, get her primed

6

for the questions.

7

MR. BEASLIN:

8

THE COURT:

9

If you start

So

Okay.
Okay?

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

10

(The following proceedings were

11

held in chambers:)
THE COURT: We are in chambers.

12

Just to let

13

you know.

14

document that Mr. Wallentine gave me. And he gave me

15

to understand that he's going to introduce the

16

document concerning the plea.

17

problems with that.

18

what you are entitled to ask is if she's pled or found

19

guilty and what she pled to and then not go into the

20

facts.

21

I asked my clerk to get a copy of the

I have some real

I think that, Mr. Wallentine,

MR. WALLENTINE: Judge, I think that you are

22

mistaken.

And, unfortunately, I don't have advance

23

notice of whether I think you are going to be mistaken

24

and make a ruling to allow me to prepare to show you

25

that you are mistaken.

I do have a research file

1

prepared down in my office on introducing prior

2

convictions. And my recollection is that I am

3

entitled to ask her about the prior conviction and

4

entitled to ask her date of birth and identifying

5

information and introduce the conviction itself into

6

evidence before the jury.

7

THE COURT: If she denies it, I think you are

8

entitled to those kinds of things.

9

it, there isnft any need for that.

But if she admits

10

MR. BEASLIN:

11

MR. WALLENTINE: The proof under State vs.

Yes.

12

Petersen showing a prior conviction to discredit a

13

witness may be shown by oral testimony of the witness*

14

himself or by the court record of such conviction or a

15

properly certified copy thereof.

16

entitled to any means I can show, Your Honor.

I think I am

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WALLENTINE: Especially where it's a

No.

19

document that she's executed within days of this

20

trial. And, by the way, on that same, on State vs.

21

Ross, the Court of Appeals has found forgery to be a

22

crime of dishonesty.

23

THE COURT: I think you have already

24

convinced me of that.

It's just how far you can take

25

these things. And if she admits to it that's it. You

1

don't need to go into the facts, What did you do

2

factually?

3

a crime involving dishonesty, that's all.

4

able to get the elements of the offense in, but that

5

wouldn't necessarily come from her.

It just shows that she's been convicted of
You may be

MR. WALLENTINE: Your Honor, she's signed an

6
7

affidavit that has the elements listed.

8

why I can't introduce the elements that way.
THE COURT: Do you have any if he just asks?

9

MR. BEASLIN:

10
11

I don't see

the forgery.

She'll admit that she pled to

That's all.

THE COURT: I don't know if the jury

12
13

understands what a forgery is.

14

elements of the offense without going into the facts,

15

I think that's probably fair.

16

necessarily know that.
MR. BEASLIN:

17

She didn't know the facts.

19

elements are.

She doesn't know what the

THE COURT: She signed the affidavit.

20

Why

don't I give you a minute to go over the affidavit.
MR. BEASLIN:

22
23

says.

24

the two charges.

25

But they wouldn't

Who is going to testify to it?

18

21

If they give the

She knows what the affidavit

She's willing to admit she did plead guilty to

THE COURT:

Okay.

1

MR, BEASLIN:

2

THE COURT:

3

That's all.
But somebody is going to have to

get the elements in.

4

AIR. BEASLIN:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. WALLENTINE:

7

Either she does or -This document does right

here.
MR. BEASLIN:

8
9

Who is going to do that?

If you let that document in,

that's all.

10

THE COURT: Pardon me?

11

MR. BEASLIN:

I said, that's all the

12

document.

13

decide whether or not if the elements are in there,

14

whatever it is.

15

You can show the document, let the jury

THE COURT:

16

advance of a plea.

17

bit too far.

18
19
20

I hate to put in the affidavit in
That plea would be going a little

MR. WALLENTINE:

I don't think there is any

authority, Your Honor, for that position.
THE COURT:

I have a lot of discretion, I

21

think, unfortunately, for, I guess, trial counsel.

22

You know, to decide whether or not it's going too far

23

under 403.

24
25

And I just don't -- somehow or other we --

MR. BEASLIN:

I don't feel comfortable about

it either, other than the fact that she can say yes I

1

pled guilty to a felony.

That's all.

THE COURT: You can ask her a leading

2
3

question.

Can you plead guilty and read the elements.

4

And thatf s how --

5

MR. BEASLIN:

6

THE COURT: And no further.

As far as you go.
Did she plead?

7

Yes or no.

When you pled guilty were these the

8

elements?

9

then you'll be given some opportunity to go further.

Yes or no.

If she answers inappropriately,

10

You better spend some time with her and talk to her

11

about that issue, Mr. Beaslin.

12

MR. BEASLIN:

I did tell her that.

13

tell her, just answer yes for the elements,

14

particularly to the fact that she pled.

15

her as to the elements.

16

are.

17

I did

I'll go tell

Say, yes, thatfs what they

That's all.
MR. WALLENTINE: Two other things for the

18

record, if you are through ruling on that and if you

19

have noted my exception?

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. WALLENTINE: If Mr. King attempts to take

Yes.

22

the stand again, I am going to move for a mistrial

23

based on the fact that he and Miss Hatch discussed the

24

testimony during a break just a few moments ago. And,

25

also, I would like to recall Sergeant Hatzidakis to

1

discuss under Rule 608, the fact that hefs known Miss

2

Hatch for many, many years in this community and is

3

well aware of her general reputation for

4

untruthfulness.
MR. BEASLIN:

5
6
7
8
9

that.

I don't know anything about

I don't know if he did or not.
THE COURT: You can't bring that up unless

they bring up -MR. WALLENTINE:

"The credibility of a

10

witness may be attacked in the form of opinion or

11

reputation subject to these limitations.

12

may refer only to the character for truthfulness or

13

untruthfulness, and evidence of truthful character is

14

admissible only after the character of the witness for

15

truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or

16

reputation evidence or otherwise."

The evidence

17

THE COURT: What rule are you on?

18

MR. WALLENTINE: 608(a).

19

THE COURT: What page?

20

MR. WALLENTINE: 603, Your Honor.

21
22
23
24
25

I think I

have the new on the '97 version.
MR. BEASLIN:

Now, do we know what they are

talking about?
THE COURT: I thought that there was an
exclusion for defendants.

AD?. WALLENTINE:

1

I am not aware of any.

Your

2

Honor, I think, in fact, a couple of the cases were

3

yours in 1990.

4

State v s . Dan York?

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. WALLENTINE:

Didn't you do in Duchesne County,

I don't think so.
With Loretta Purdy?

7

was at the court of appeals?

8

Hoyt.

9

Your Honor.

10

When I

And State v s . Marilyn

I am not aware of any exception for defendants,

THE COURT:

Mr. Beaslin, I guess it's -- I

11

guess I have to rely upon you.

12

wasn't allowed except after the credibility had been

13

challenged.

14

MR. WALLENTINE:

No.

It seemed to me that

I see what you are

15

thinking, Judge.

You can't introduce testimony in for

16

character for truthfulness until after character for

17

untruthfulness has been established.

18

MR. BEASLIN:

19

THE COURT:

20
21

Yes, untruthfulness.
So why are you concerned about

reputation then if it doesn't go to truthfulness?
MR. WALLENTINE:

No, it does.

What I am

22

saying is, I am entitled under 608 to bring in a

23

witness who can testify, I have known this witness "X"

24

number of years.

25

the community.

I am familiar with her reputation in

Her reputation is she's an untruthful

1

person.

2

opportunity to bring in evidence of a reputation for

3

untruthfulness.

4

However, Mr. Beaslin could not proffer to the jury

5

evidence of a general reputation for truthfulness

6

until, until I had attacked her credibility.

7

entitled to throw the first salvo. And by taking the

8

stand she has based her --

However, the reverse is not true.

But I am

THE COURT: Just reading the rule, I think

9
10

At that point, then the opposing side has an

that appears to be right.

11

MR. WALLENTINE: Your Honor, I don't mean to

12

be cocky, but the two cases, State vs. York and State

13

vs. Hoyt are cases that I was pretty heavily involved.

14

York is a sex abuse trial. And I am almost

15

100 percent sure you were the judge.

16

Duchesne County.

17

who was the secretary over there.

It was tried in

The witness who was Loretta Purdy,

18

THE COURT: I wasn't the judge.

19

just reading the rule, you are correct, unless Mr.

20

Beaslin can point out how some other rule or some

21

other basis for keeping it --

22

MR. BEASLIN:

23

kind of hit me flat.

25

I don't know, Your Honor.

happens.

Just

I don't know.

THE COURT: I can't help.

24

But I think

Surprise is what

So you'll be allowed under Rule 608,

1

apparently.

2

any other objections?

3
4

Okay.

M r . Beaslin, if y o u can think of

(The following proceedings were held in
open court with the jury present:)
THE COURT:

5

The record will indicate counsel

6

and parties are present.

7

o n the stand.

8

present and n o w the witness is in place.

9

M r . Wallentine.

Record will indicate the jury is

MR. WALLENTINE:

10
11
12

Would y o u like to come back

Thank you, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR.

WALLENTINE:

13

Q

What is your date of birth?

14

A

6/28/57.

15

THE COURT:

16

THE WITNESS:

17

BY MR.

18

0

1957?
Yes.

WALLENTINE:

Have y o u been convicted of any -- and we will

19

limit this -- felony crimes involving dishonesty,

20

making of false statements?

21

MR. BEASLIN:

I think it should b e worded

22

differently with reference to -- refer to the case.

23

Refer to what she did.

24
25

THE COURT:

That's all*

Y o u rephrase that in terms of

specific crimes, M r . Wallentine?
252

1

2

BY MR.

WALLENTINE:

Q

Sure.

Have you ever been convicted of a

3

crime involving facilitating a fraud or making,

4

completing, executing, authenticating, issuing,

5

transferring, publishing, or uttering any writing so

6

that the making, completion, execution,

7

authentication, issuance, transference, publication or

8

utterance purported to be the act of another,

9

specifically, to wit, a number of bank checks issued

10

on another person's account?

11

A

Y e s . I plead guilty on two counts, forgery.

12

0

And those are felony forgeries, and that was

13
14

within the last few days?
A

About a week ago, I think.
MR. WALLENTINE:

15

Few weeks?

I would move for admission

16

of Exhibit 3, Your Honor, which the court's examined

17

in chambers and Mr. Beaslin.

18

MR. BEASLIN:

19

MR. WALLENTINE:

20

23
24
25

Has signed and affixed his

signature to.
THE COURT:

21
22

No objection.

You have no objection, M r .

Beaslin?
MR. BEASLIN:

N o , Your Honor.

It's a matter

of record.
THE COURT:

Exhibit No. 3 will be received.

Addendum B

JoANN B. STRINGHAM, #0353
Uintah County AttorneyAttorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: 435-781-5436

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

AUG 3
BY

" v' > ^

^

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF COMMITMENT

vs,
KANDICE HATCH,

CASE NO. 981800008 FS
Judge John R. Anderson
Defendant,

This matter having come on regularly before this Court for
sentencing on the 11th day of August, 1998, the Honorable John R.
Anderson presiding.
Stringham,

Uintah

The State being represented by JoAnn B.
County

Attorney,

and

the

Defendant

being

personally present and represented by counsel, John C. Beaslin.
The defendant having been convicted of or having plead guilty
to two counts of FORGERY, Third Degree felonies, in violation of
Section 76-6-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The Court, having received a Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report from the Department of Corrections, having reviewed the
same, the Defendant, having previously been furnished the said Presentence Investigation Report, admitted there were no inaccuracies

> / ^

DEPUTY

or was furnished the opportunity to have a hearing to challenge any
claimed inaccuracies, and no legal reason having been shown why
judgment

and sentencing

should not be pronounced,

entered a

Judgment as follows:
1.

That the Defendant is hereby sentenced on Count I,

FORGERY, a Third Degree Felony, to serve zero (0) to Five (5) years
in the Utah State Prison.
2.

That the Defendant is sentenced on Count II, FORGERY, a

Third Degree Felony, to serve zero (0) to Five (5) years in the
Utah State Prison.
3.

That these prison terms be served concurrent with each

other and with Judge Payne's burglary charge, Case No. 971800246.
4.

That the Defendant pay restitution in the total amount of

ONE THOUSAND FORTY AND NO/100 DOLLAR ($1,040.00) . Said restitution
should be paid to the Eighth Judicial District Court and reimbursed
to the victims as follows:
a.

NINE HUNDRED SIXTY DOLLARS

Davis IGA, 575 West Main, Vernal, Utah
b.

($960.00) payable to

84078.

EIGHTY DOLLARS ($80.00) payable to Smith's Food

King, 1080 West Highway 40, Vernal, Utah 84078.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That the Defendant is forthwith remanded to the custody of the
Uintah County Sheriff for transportation to the Utah State Prison
and execution of the sentence given herein.

DATED this

>/

day of August, 1

AJOHN R. ANDERSON
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/ V ^ ^ C>fi~eil4&SrL
C. BEASLIN
'Attorney f o r Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I do h e r e b y c e r t i f y
delivered,

a

true

copy

that
of

the

COMMITMENT t o J o h n C. B e a s l i n ,
V e r n a l Avenue, V e r n a l ,

UT

I mailed,

postage prepaid,

foregoing

JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF

Attorney for Defendant,

84078.

STATE OF UTAH 1 S S
County of Uintah J
i, Joanne McKee, Clerk of the District Court, do
hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a
full, true and correct copy of the original document
which is on file in my office.
In witness whe^of I hereunto sat my hand a^dseal
of that said Court above mentioned, this.
.A.D. ?&%
day of.

Ey.

JOANNE

185 N o r t h

84078; Department of C o r r e c t i o n s ,

E a s t 100 N o r t h , V e r n a l , UT; a n d t h e U i n t a h C o u n t y J a i l ,

/7

o r hand

MCXEE/

Deputy

fiJ

152

V e r n a l , UT

Addendum C

1

A

Almost 20, yes, sir.

2

Q

Now, I am not going to ask you to do any

3

scientific analysis for us.

4

straight forward question.

5

to people, when you determine later by the facts to be

6

truthful, about their story being consistent?

7

A

8

0

9

I would like to ask you a
Do you find when you speak

Yes.
So what does it suggest to you when you get a

an a, b, or c, a gut to tell for somebody that

10

somebody gave it to me then somebody gave it, pawn it

11

store it for you?
THE COURT: Just a minute.

12

It's asking him

13

to evaluate on and comment on the truthfulness of the

14

statement.

MR. BEASLIN:

15
16

17

He's not qualified to do that.

BY MR.

Q

I agree.

WALLENTINE:

Would you find it to be an indicator of

18

accuracy and veracity to have inconsistent statements

19

offered to you?

20

A

I am sorry.

21

0

Would you find it -- would it suggest to you

One more time.

22

that a person is being truthful when they gave you

23

inconsistent statements?

24
25

A

I would not believe -MR. BEASLIN:

I still object.

1

THE COURT: Sustained.

2

MR. BEASLIN:

3

Honor.
THE COURT: He's not going to be qualified to

4
5

Form of the question, Your

say whether or not this -MR. WALLENTINE: I am asking not as an

6
7

expert.

8

foundation.

9

just when people who change their story is likely to

10

I thought I made that plain in the
But just in the thousands of interviews,

be truthful or not truthful.

11

THE COURT: He's not qualified.

12

THE WITNESS:

13

14
15
16
17

B 7 MR.

Q

WALLENTINE:

In this case, however, you were given

A

I was given inconsistent stories as to this

particular case.
MR. WALLENTINE:

19

21

I understand.

inconsistent statements; is that true?

18

20

Sorry.

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR.

Q

BEASLIN:

Sergeant Hatzidakis, about when did you get

22

involved in it after the March 15th determination that

23

the storage unit had been broken into?

24
25

A

I want to say the case was assigned to me on

April 8th. And I spent between the 8th and the 24th

Addendum D

i

1

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3

2

was received into evidence.)
WALLENTINE:

3

B Y MR.

4

0

How long have you lived in this community?

5

A

Urn, about 17 years.

6

Q

And are you familiar with Sergeant

7

Hatzidakis?

8

A

Yeah.

9

0

I see you place some particular emphasis on

10

that.

11

A

Why is that?
He came to the college parking lot and

12

harassed me one time about what this girl Francis said

13

about me. And when I went to court, I won.

14

Q

Have you dealt with him on other occasions?

15

A

No.

16

0

Never?

17

A

Just this saddle thing.

18

Q

So there are only two times. Both times you

19

were accused of a crime that you have dealt with him;

20

is that correct?

21

A

Yeah.

22

Q

So if I were to introduce evidence of other

23

times when you dealt with him where you were not

24

actually arrested and taken into custody, you wouldn't

25

have any recollection of those times?

1
2

A

Probably not because I have only done two

dealings with him.

3

Q

And you are quite certain?

4

A

That I can remember.

5

Q

And you are quite certain of that?

6

A

I am pretty sure.

7
8
9

That's only two times I

can remember.
Q

Before the break you testified that you were

angry with Mr. Wilson over, and you said abandoning

10

your children and exposing them being picked up by

11

Social Services; is that correct?

12

A

No, sir.

That's not how I said it.

13

0

What!s not correct?

14

A

I didn't say I was angry.

I said I was

15

really upset and it really hurt me. And he's not

16

the -- I did not state he exposed my children to

17

Social Service.

18

0

Had you dealt with Social Services before?

19

A

Yes, I have.

20

Q

With respect to having your children taken

21

away?

22

A

No, sir.

23

Q

Why did you go to Craig, Colorado at the time

24
25

you picked up the strawberry planter?
A

I went down there and asked Bill if I could

1

have my stuff back.

2

Q

Have you ever pawned anything?

3

A

Oh, yeah.

4

Q

On many occasions?

5

A

Yeah.

6

Q

Have you ever pawned anything at any time at

7

Jiffy Pawn?

8

A

Sure.

9

Q

So you are familiar with the procedure?

10

A

Yes, sir.

11

Q

How many times have you met with Mr. Beaslin

12

I got stuff in there right now.

to discuss your story here today?

13

A

Probably, about four or five times or more.

14

Q

And have you had just as many discussions

15

about what you would say here with your other

16

daughters?

17
18
19
20

A

Not really.

Very depressing subject to talk

and discuss about, to tell you the truth.
0

You heard Mr. King come in and testify a

little bit earlier; is that correct?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Did you listen to what he had to say?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Did you hear him list a number of people that

25

he said provided him a story?

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Were you one of those people who helped him

A

Yes.

3

out?

4
5

MR. WALLENTINE: Thank you.

6

THE COURT: He asked where the saddle came

7

from.

Mr. Beaslin.

8

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

9

B Y MR.

10

0

BEASLIN:

Just a couple of questions.

With reference

11

when you took the saddle down there at one time, you

12

intended to sell it, you didn't intend to pawn it, did

13

you?

14

A

No, I did not intend to pawn it.

15

Q

All you wanted was to get the money for it

16

and that was it?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

When you talked to Bill, he told you to do

19
20

what you wanted with it?
A

Yes.

But he told me I could go down and sell

21

it, and it would reimburse a lot more than what it

22

did.

23

0

And I think, and I believe Mr. Wallentine --

24

you answered the question, you had gone over to Craig

25

in an effort to try and obtain some of the things

1

back, what you said he had taken of yours; is that

2

correct?

3

A

4
5
6

Yes.

Because his nephew said his stuff was

at his apartment.
Q

He seen it there.

Which is more than the vacuum, the planter,

and the freezer?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Separate items that you felt he owed you he

9
10

had taken and hadn't returned?
A

Yes. A lot of stuff.

11

MR. BEASLIN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. WALLENTINE:

14

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, do you have

Okay.

Mr. Wallentine?
No.

15

any questions of this witness?

16

marked as number two.

17

I believe that's all.

Okay.

This will be

Record indicate no objections.

Would you handle that, Mr. Wallentine?

18

B Y MR.

19

0

WALLENTINE:

Certainly.

Tell us the specific date that

20

Mr. Wilson showed up at your trailer and brought you

21

this saddle.

22

A

23

sure.

Approximately, about March 14th, I am pretty
Fourteenth or 15th.

24

MR. BEASLIN:

25

THE COURT: All right.

That's fine.
Gentlemen, any other

1

questions?

3

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

4
5

I believe that f s all we have,

MR. BEASLIN:

2

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,

any other questions?

6

May step down.

7

MR.

8

Your Honor.

10

We rest.

THE COURT:

9

I believe that f s all we have,

BEASLIN:

Defense rests.

Mr. Wallentine,

any rebuttal?
MR. WALLENTINE:

11
12

Sergeant Hatzidakis.

SERGEANT STEVE HATZIDAKIS,

13

called by the Plaintiff, having been duly

14

sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

15

REBUTTAL EXAMINATION

16

DIRECT EXAMINATION

17

B Y MR.

18

0

WALLENTINE:
Sergeant, is it accurate for me to state that

19

before becoming employed at the sheriff's office after

20

Sheriff Hawkins was elected that you also worked at

21

Vernal City Police Department?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Worked there for many years; is that correct?

24

A

I have been in Vernal 12 years, all in law

25

enforcement.

1

0

And with that city you also had been promoted

2

several times and, at one point, were in the patrol

3

division; is that correct?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Sergeant Hatzidakis, you just heard the

6

defendant testify that she's only dealt with you on

7

two occasions over those 12 years that you have been

8

here in town.

9

thatfs accurate or not?

Would you please tell the jury whether

10

A

Very inaccurate.

11

Q

Very inaccurate?

12

A

Very inaccurate.

13

0

In fact, if we multiplied that perhaps by a

14

factor of 10, even more, would that be accurate if you

15

can have, if you have a specific recollection?

16
17

A

Let's just say I have dealt with her

numerous, numerous times.

18

0

But without disclosing --

19

A

Okay.

20

0

without disclosing any of the specifics of

21

those particular times, and that's been over the

22

entire 12 years?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Without disclosing any of the specifics,

25

Sergeant Hatzidakis, would you be able to tell the

1

jury whether the defendant has a reputation in this

2

community for truthfulness or untruthfulness?

3

A

Yes.
MR.

4

BEASLIN:

I think I would object to that,

5

Your Honor, for the record with reference to his

6

knowledge, as to whether or not he is specifically

7

going into any particular area that would be

8

necessarily helpful to this jury, I don't think, with

9

reference to that without something more than just the

10

fact that they had had meetings or confrontations or

11

whatever for whatever reason.
MR.

12

WALLENTINE:

Your Honor, there is nothing

13

I would like more than to ask specific instances.

14

the Rule 608(a) we have just discussed in chambers, I

15

have limited my question exactly and, in fact, Your

16

Honor, I have tracked the language of the rule itself.
THE COURT:

17

We did discuss that.

And we

18

don't need to bore the jury with those things.

19

it's good that they know we were working and not

20

playing.
MR. WALLENTINE:

21
22
23

But

Maybe

I am not sure it was boring,

Judge.
THE COURT:

I am going to sustain the

24

objection on this basis, that the issue is his

25

knowledge of the witness 1 reputation in the community,

1

not among law enforcement, but in the community at

2

large.

MR. WALLENTINE: I am sorry.

3
4
5

6

You ask the proper question.
That was the

question I intended to ask.
BY MR.

Q

WALLENTINE:

Whether in the course of your dealings, not

7

only with your officers, but other people that have

8

been, and again without disclosing circumstances,

9

other people who have been involved in those

10

situations with the defendant?

11

MR. BEASLIN:

12

THE COURT: Sustained.

I object to that.
The issue of

13

Mr. Wallentine is not with respect to any particular

14

area, investigations or non-investigations, just is he

15

familiar with the reputation of this person's --

16

excuse me -- is he familiar with this person's

17

reputation in the community with respect to honesty.

18

That's all.
MR. WALLENTINE: What I am trying to do is

19
20

lay the foundation for his ability to give that.
THE COURT: But it doesn't relate to

21
22

investigations at all.

23

question, I think we'll be all right.

24

25

BY MR.

0

See, leave that out of your

WALLENTINE:

Are you aware of whether or not the defendant

1

has a reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness?

2

A

3

Q

Yes,
What is that reputation?
MR. BEASLIN:

4

I think I object on the same

5

basis.

I still don't think there is a proper

6

foundation with reference to the community at large.
THE COURT:

7

Overruled.

I think that

8

that f s -- you can cross-examine him on the issue.

9

Overruled.
WALLENTINE:

LO

B Y MR.

LI

0

What is her reputation?

L2

A

I think it would be more towards the

13

untruthfulness or deceptive.

L4

0

L5

A

L6

Q

Having said that, Sergeant Hatzidakis -Yes.
- - d o you approach every situation with an

L7

open mind so that your past dealings with someone

L8

don't characterization, color your interviews and

L9

force you to prejudge their guilt or innocence?

20

A

I do.

21

MR. WALLENTINE:

22

THE COURT:

23
24

25

Thank you.

Mr. Beaslin?

CROSS-EXAMINATION
B Y MR.

Q

BEASLIN:

Sergeant Hatzidakis, you don't really have a

1

feel for the pulse of the community as such as an

2

officer and so forth wherein you can make those kinds

3

of statements about a person based upon the general

4

reputation for a individual in the community, can you?
MR.

5

WALLENTINE:

Objection.

The ruling does

6

not provide a pulse on the community.

Provides

7

whether a person has dealt with a witness or a

8

defendant and whether through those dealings is able

9

to determine whether there is a reputation, not

10

whether the witness is aware of the entire community's

11

view of her truthfulness or untruthfulness.

12

MR.

BEASLIN:

13

THE COURT:

The other question.
Just a minute, Mr. Wallentine.

14

think that he can go into whether or not he is

15

familiar with the reputation of the community.

16

Overruled.

17

BY MR.

18

0

I

BEASLIN:
The question is whether or not, do you, is it

19

based upon your individual thought about that, or does

20

it relate to others you have talked to, been close to,

21

talked about, or whatever, as relates to this

22

defendant?

23

contact with Miss Hatch with reference to your serving

24

as a cop or whatever.

25

A

Is it solely based upon your personal

It's been a professional situation.

I mean

1

as a law enforcement officer.

2

people.

A n d it's with other

3

Q

So it isn't necessarily --

4

A

It's not law enforcement specific.

5
6
7
8
9

It's the

community o r people within the community.
0

Okay.

A n d that's as far as y o u c a n g o with

reference to saying that?
A

Sure.
M R . BEASLIN:

I believe that's all.

10

THE COURT: Anything further?

11

MR. WALLENTINE:

12

THE COURT:

13

Y o u m a y step down, then.

14

M R . WALLENTINE:

15

THE COURT:

No.

Jury have any questions o n that?

Bill Wilson.

Ladies and gentlemen, one of the

16

exhibits that h a s been spoken about is Exhibit N o . 3.

17

I have that in m y hand.

A n d that's been actually

18

received into evidence.

What it is, is a n affidavit

19

of defendant in advance of a plea of guilty and

20

agreement.

21

executed within the last recent period of time.

22

Actually, o n the 25th of February 1998, wherein Miss

23

Hatch pled guilty to two forgery offenses.

24

other things in it that don't have anything to d o with

25

this case.

A s the evidence h a s indicated, this w a s

This h a s

So I a m just going to give y o u that

1

information.

She's admitted to that. And rather than

2

to give you this exhibit to go into the jury room,

3

I'll just indicate that if you were to review this,

4

what you would find that would be relevant was the

5

information I just gave you.

6

That will be withheld from the jury.

7

You may proceed.

8

BILL WILSON,

9

called by the Plaintiff, having been duly

10

sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

11

DIRECT EXAMINATION

12

B y MR.

13

0

WALLENTINE:

Mr. Wilson, you are still under oath.

You

14

were given an instruction by the judge earlier to not

15

discuss your testimony with anyone after you were

16

sworn as a witness.

Do you remember that?

17

A

Correct.

18

Q

Did you follow that instruction, sir?

19

A

I have talked to you.

20

Q

You havenft talked to any of the witnesses,

21
22

haven't talked to any of the jurors?
A

Not about the case, no.

23

THE COURT:

24

THE WITNESS:

25

Clarify that.
No.

I have talked to my son

out here in the hallway, and he's not part of the

Addendum E

1

convicted felon.

2

irrelevant, but something that tells you what kind of

3

person she is.

4

right.

5

Not convicted of something that's

Whether indeed Sergeant Hatzidakis is

Now, she says she f s only dealt with him twice

6

over 12 years that he's been in town.

He told you

7

many, many, many occasions he's dealt with her, her

8

and other people.

9

reputation is.

And he's able to tell you what her

And that was his opinion.

That's all.

10

That's all any of us can give.

He gave you an opinion

11

after dealing with her.

12

people that was dealing with her that she has a

13

reputation in town for untruthfulness.

14

that you don't just have his opinion, you have a

15

document of this court, a conviction of this court,

16

Eighth District Court, in which on two occasions, at

17

least, the defendant stands convicted before you of a

18

crime of dishonesty.

19

And you know it's not really so complex.

20

to go back and weigh the stories, which one's true and

21

which one's not.

And he listened to other

But beyond

So that's what it comes down to.
Your task is

Thank you.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BEASLIN:

Mr. Beaslin.
May it please the court,

24

Mr. Wallentine, ladies and gentlemen of the jury:

As

25

you can tell, and as I mentioned to you in my opening

Addendum F

1

So the state is presenting to you today a

2

story, Bill Williams1 storage shed being broken into,

3

the burglary, by force, property destroyed, saddle

4

taken out of it, saddle taken down to Jiffy Pawn.

5

you see not just Bill's the victim here, not just

6

Grace is the victim here.

7

pay out money.

8

much to you.

9

adds up pretty quick.

Jiffy Pawn.

But

They had to

They are out 50 bucks. May not seem

But 50 bucks here, 50 bucks there, it
They are deceived into giving

10

$50 because the defendant says, I have the right to

11

sell this.

12

Signs her name below.

13

So based on her representation, her deception, Jiffy

14

Pawn gives up $50, which they still donft have back.

15

I am the legal owner of said property.
Leaves her fingerprint there.

And after the case is over, the best thing

16

here today is, I am going to be able to give Grace her

17

saddle back.

i8

you to listen carefully to what Deputy Byron has to

19

say to you.

20

Jiffy Pawn will be out.

Bill Wilson.

Grace Sharp.

So I would like

Jason Dansie.

21

He's the fellow -- his sister-in-law was here

22

earlier -- he's the fellow who also signed this and

23

witnessed it at Jiffy Pawn Shop. And then we'll also

24

ask you to listen to Sergeant Hatzidakis as he tells

25

you what happened when he went to confront the

1

defendant and how her story shifted and changed to

2

suit what might be most convenient, and how he didn f t

3

think he could believe her simply because she was

4

telling a shifting story.

5

say.

6

And I'll ask you to listen carefully as I present to

7

her the records of her past, her most recent past, her

8

convictions wherein she admitted, finally, to the

9

court that she was lying about other things.

We'll see what she has to

I'll ask you to listen carefully to her as well.

And at

10

the end of the day you have one job here.

11

some legal instructions.

12

give you a bunch of papers.

13

it will explain the law from here to there.

14

are here to do one thing, and that's to find the

15

truth.

16

tore up Bill Wilson's storage shed, busted up his

17

entertainment center.

18

fatal mistake, by darn.

He left her and went back to

19

his buddy, his ex-wife.

Saddle went down to Jiffy

20

Pawn.

21

the money.

22

defendant is here today to answer for it.

23

you are here, is to tell us what the truth is.

24

you.

25

You'll get

And, we're lawyers.

We'll

That's what we do.

And

But you

And the truth is this defendant got mad, she

She took the saddle.

Jiffy Pawn made out the money.
Grace is out the saddle.

THE COURT:

He made a

They are out
And the
That's why

Thank you, Mr. Wallentine.

Thank

Mr.

Addendum G

1

opportunity to make a telephone call.

In fact, we are

2

going to -- we may take opening statements before we

3

go to lunch.

4

you can go and call, tell your work, tell your husband

5

or wife, whoever else needs to know, you can tell them

6

that you'll be here and you'll be a juror in this

7

case.

8

party.

But the first thing that will happen is

Then we'll have an opening statement by each

9

Now, the opening statements that are given

10

are so that you can understand, from the time that the

11

case starts, about what the case is about.

12

you an overview of the case.

13

the opening statement.

14

opening statement, during final argument, and during

15

all of the process of trial, their statements are not

16

evidence.

17

not examined and cross-examined.

18

take those statements for your use and consideration,

19

but you shouldn't consider their statements as being

20

evidence.

21

get into the jury room and you are deliberating this

22

matter, if the attorneys have said something as to

23

what happened, and you remember it differently, you go

24

according to your memory.

25

given the opportunity to speak with the other members

It gives

The attorneys present

What the attorneys say during

They are not placed under oath.

They are

And so you are to

And if you are chosen to be a juror and you

And, of course, you'll be

1

of the jury concerning those issues.

2

After the opening statement, each party will

3

be given an opportunity to present evidence.

First

4

the state will be given the opportunity.

5

call their witnesses. As each witness is called, the

6

other side will be given an opportunity to

7

cross-examine the witnesses which have been called.

8

After that process has been taken care of or, in fact,

9

during that process, there may be certain items of

10

physical evidence such as documents or other things

11

that are submitted for the jury's consideration as

12

evidence.

They will

13

At the conclusion of all the evidence, the

14

court will instruct you as to the law in this case.

15

And I talked to you about that a little bit in the

16

past.

17

jury room, you'll be given a written packet of jury

18

instructions which will contain the law which will

19

guide you during your jury deliberations.

20

the law to you, you need to remember that you'll be

21

given that in writing.

22

into the jury room.

23

What that means is that when you go into the

As I give

You'll be able to take that

Again, I'll remind you that it is your

24

obligation to follow the law as I give it to you

25

regardless of what you believe the law is or ought to
88

1

be.

2

attorneys will be given a final opportunity to speak

3

with you.

4

of the trial.

5

what the law is, looking at what the facts are in the

6

case, and trying to convince you as to a particular

7

result based upon the law and the facts in this case.

8

Again, I'll remind you that what they say in this

9

matter is not evidence.

10

After you are instructed as to the law, the

That is referred to as the argument phase
At that time, they will be looking at

Now, let me introduce you.

You have been

11

introduced to everybody except I think these three or

12

four people here.

13

Mr. McKee.

14

certain responsibilities with respect to the court.

15

One is to maintain order and security within the

16

courtroom.

17

responsibility with respect to the jury.

18

the jury to and from the courtroom as you go into the

19

jury room.

20

court, you do that through the bailiff.

21

in writing.

22

down, and he brings whatever you have written down to

23

the court.

24

attorneys.

25

Let me first introduce you to

He is the bailiff in the court.

He has

He, however, has a particular
He will take

And if you need to- communicate with the

Just don't speak to him.

And you do it

You write it

And then I consider that with the

Mrs. Teeguarden is my court clerk.

She is to

Addendum H

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

).Q

Any statement of counsel made during the course of the trial or during
argument which is not supported by the evidence is to be wholly disregarded.

